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Abstract
Two threads of research have been pursued in par-
allel in logic and artificial intelligence. On the one
hand, in artificial intelligence, logic-based theories
have been developed to study and formalize belief
change and the so-called “common sense reason-
ing”, i.e. the actual reasoning of humans. On the
other hand, in logic, substructural logics, i.e. log-
ics lacking some of the structural rules of classical
logic, have been studied in depth from a theoreti-
cal point of view. However, the powerful (proof-
theoretical) techniques and methods developed in
logic have not yet been applied to artificial intel-
ligence. Conditional logic and belief revision the-
ory are prominent theories in artificial intelligence
dealing with common sense reasoning. We show in
this article that they can both be embedded within
the framework of substructural logics and can both
be seen as extensions of the Lambek calculus. This
allows us to compare and relate them to each other
systematically, via a natural formalization of the
Ramsey test.
1 Introduction
In everyday life, the way we update and revise our beliefs
plays an important role in our representation of the surround-
ing world and therefore also in our decision making process.
This has lead researchers in artificial intelligence and com-
puter science to develop logic-based theories that study and
formalize belief change and the so-called “common sense
reasoning”. The rationale underlying the development of
such theories is that it would ultimately help us understand
our everyday life reasoning and the way we update our be-
liefs, and that the resulting work could subsequently lead to
the development of tools that could be used for example by
artificial agents in order to act autonomously in an uncertain
and changing world.
A number of theories have been proposed to capture dif-
ferent kinds of updates and the reasoning styles that they in-
duce, using different formalisms and under various assump-
tions: dynamic epistemic logic [van Benthem, 2011], default
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and non-monotonic logics [Makinson, 2005], belief revision
theory [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988], conditional logic [Nute and Cross,
2001], etc. . . However, a generic and general framework en-
compassing all these theories is still lacking. Instead, the cur-
rent state of the art is such that we are left with various for-
malisms which are difficult to relate formally to each other
despite numerous attempts [Makinson and Ga¨rdenfors, 1989;
Aucher, 2004; Baltag and Smets, 2008], partly because they
rely on different kinds of formalisms. This is problematic if
logic is to be viewed ultimately as a unified and unifying field
and if we want to avoid that logic goes on “riding off madly
in all directions” (a metaphor used by van Benthem [2011]).
Our objective in this article is to show that conditional logic
and belief revision can be reformulated meaningfully and nat-
urally within the very general framework of substructural log-
ics [Restall, 2000]. More specifically, we will show that con-
ditional logic and belief revision theory are extensions of the
well-known Lambek calculus with appropriate structural in-
ference rules. This will allow us to compare and relate them
to each other systematically. In particular, our approach will
shed new lights on Ga¨rdenfors’ impossibility theorem that
draws attention to certain formal difficulties in defining a con-
ditional connective from a revision operation, via the Ramsey
test. We will also pinpoint the key to non-monotonicity and
we will show that it depends crucially on a constrained appli-
cation of the (left) weakening rule.
Other proof theoretical approaches to non-monotonic rea-
soning have already been proposed, notably by Bonatti
and Olivetti [2002][1992]. However, they deal with non-
monotonicity at the meta-logical level by introducing specific
inference relations like |∼ or B. Instead of it, we will deal
with non-monotonicity at the object-language level by means
of the substructural connective ⊃ and the introduction of ap-
propriate structural rules.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we briefly
recall elementary notions of substructural logics and we ob-
serve that the ternary relation can be interpreted intuitively as
a kind of update. In Section 3, we recall the basics of condi-
tional logic and belief revision theory and recall how they are
formally connected. In Section 4, we show how each of them
can be embedded within the framework of substructural logic
that was introduced in Section 2 by adding specific structural
inference rules. In Section 5, we discuss Ga¨rdenfors’ impos-
sibility theorem. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 Substructural Logics
Substructural logics are a family of logics lacking some of
the structural rules of classical logic. A structural rule is a
rule of inference which is closed under substitution of for-
mulas. The structural rules for classical logic are given in
Fig. 1: they are called Weakening, Contraction, Permutation
and Associativity (see Definition 2 for explanations about the
notations used). The comma in these sequents has to be inter-
preted as a conjunction in an antecedent and as a disjunction
in a consequent. While Weakening and Contraction are often
dropped like in relevance logic and linear logic, the rule of
Associativity is often preserved. When some of these rules
are dropped, the comma ceases to behave as a conjunction
(in the antecedent) or a disjunction (in the succedent). In that
case, the comma corresponds to other substructural connec-
tives and we often introduce new punctuation marks which
do not fulfill all these structural rules to deal with these new
substructural connectives.
Our exposition of substructural logics is based on [Restall,
2000, 2006] (see also Ono [1998] for a general introduction).
2.1 Syntax and Semantics
In the sequel, P is a non-empty and finite set of propositional
letters.
Definition 1 (Language L◦,⊃,⊂). The language L◦,⊃,⊂ is de-
fined inductively by the following grammar in BNF:
ϕ ::= ⊥ | p | (ϕ ∧ ϕ) | (ϕ→ ϕ)
(ϕ ◦ ϕ) | (ϕ ⊃ ϕ) | (ϕ ⊂ ϕ)
where p ranges over P. Also, → is material implication
whereas ⊃ and ⊂ are Lambek implications. If Con ⊆ {∧,→
, ◦,⊃,⊂}, then the language LCon is the language L◦,⊃,⊂ re-
stricted to the connectives of Con. The propositional lan-
guage LPL is the language LCon with Con := {∧,→}.
We will use the following abbreviations: ¬ϕ := ϕ → ⊥,
> := ¬⊥, ϕ ↔ ψ := (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ), and ϕ ∨ ψ :=
¬(¬ϕ∧¬ψ). We use the following ranking of binding strength
for parenthesis: ¬, ◦,⊃,⊂,∧,∨,→,↔. 
Definition 2 (LCon–structure, LCon–sequent and
LCon–hypersequent). Let Con ⊆ {∧,→, ◦,⊃,⊂}. LCon–
structures are defined by the following grammar in BNF:
SLConL : X ::= ϕ | (X , X) | (X ; X)
SLConR : Y ::= ϕ | (Y , Y)
where ϕ ranges over LCon. Γ[X] denotes a LCon–structure
containing as substructure theLCon–structure X, and Γ[Z] de-
notes the LCon–structure Γ[X] where X is uniformly substi-
tuted by the structure Z. LCon–structures are denoted U, X,Y
or Z and we write ϕ ∈ X when ϕ is a substructure of X.
A LCon–sequent is an expression of the form X Y ,
Y or X where X ∈ SLConL , Y ∈ SLConR . A LCon–
hypersequent has the form X1 Y1
∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ Xn Yn where
X1 Y1, . . . Xn Yn are LCon–sequents.
The depth of a LCon–structure, denoted d(X), is de-
fined inductively as follows: d(ϕ) := 0, d((X , Y)) =
max{d(X), d(Y)} and d((X ; Y)) := max{d(X), d(Y)} + 1. The
depth of a LCon–sequent X Y is defined by d(X Y) :=
max{d(X), d(Y)}. 
The semantics of substructural logics is based on the
ternary relation of the frame semantics for relevant logic orig-
inally introduced by Routley and Meyer [1972a,b, 1973];
Routley et al. [1982].
Definition 3 (Point set). A point set P = (P,v) is a set P
together with a partial order v on P. We abusively write x ∈ P
for x ∈ P. 
The partial order v (introduced for dealing with intuition-
istic reasoning) will not be used in this article.
Definition 4 (Model). A model is a tuple M = (P,R,I)
where:
• P = (P,v) is a point set;
• I : P→ 2P is an interpretation function;
• R ⊆ P × P × P is a ternary relation on P.
We abusively write x ∈ M for x ∈ P, and (M, x) is called a
pointed model. 
A model stripped out from its interpretation corresponds to
a frame as defined in [Restall, 2000, Def. 11.8] without truth
sets (defined in [Restall, 2000, Def. 11.7]). Truth sets are not
needed for what concerns us here.
Definition 5 (Truth conditions). Let M be a model, x ∈ M
and ϕ ∈ L◦,⊃,⊂. The relationM, x ϕ is defined inductively
as follows:
M, x ⊥ never
M, x p iff p ∈ I(x)
M, x ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, x ϕ andM, x ψ
M, x ϕ→ ψ iff ifM, x ϕ thenM, x ψ
M, x ϕ ◦ ψ iff there are y, z ∈ P such that Ryzx,
M, y ϕ andM, z ψ
M, x ϕ ⊃ ψ iff for all y, z ∈ P where Rxyz,
ifM, y ϕ thenM, z ψ
M, x ψ ⊂ ϕ iff for all y, z ∈ P where Ryxz
ifM, y ϕ thenM, z ψ
Let Con ⊆ {∧,→, ◦,⊃,⊂}. We extend the scope of the rela-
tion to also relate points to LCon–structures:
M, x X , Y iff M, x X andM, x Y
M, x X ; Y iff there are y, z ∈ M such that Ryzx,
M, y X andM, z Y
Let X Y be a LCon–sequent and let (M, x) be a pointed
model. We say that X Y is true at (M, x), written
M, x X Y , when the following holds:
M, x X Y iff ifM, x X, then there is ϕ ∈ Y
such thatM, x ϕ.
We say that the LCon–sequent X Y is valid, written X Y ,
when for all pointed models (M, x),M, x X Y . We say
that theLCon–hypersequent X1 Y1
∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ Xn Yn is valid,
written X1 Y1
∣∣∣ . . . ∣∣∣ Xn Yn, when X1 Y1 or . . . or
Xn Yn. 
Here is a key inference of substructural logics, more pre-
cisely of the Lambek Calculus:
χ ; ϕ ψ iff χ ϕ ⊃ ψ (RT1)
2.2 Updates as Ternary Relations
The ternary relation of the Routley and Meyer semantics was
introduced originally for technical reasons: any 2-ary (n-ary)
connective of a logical language can be given a semantics by
resorting to a 3-ary (resp. n + 1-ary) relation on worlds. Sub-
sequently, a number of philosophical interpretations of this
ternary relation have been proposed (see [Beall et al., 2012;
Restall, 2006; Mares and Meyer, 2001] for more details).
However, one has to admit that providing a non-circular and
conceptually grounded interpretation of this relation remains
problematic.
I proposed in [Aucher, 2014] a new dynamic interpretation.
The proposal is based on the observation that an update can be
represented abstractly as a ternary relation: the first argument
of the ternary relation represents the initial situation/state, the
second the event that occurs in this initial situation (the infor-
mative input) and the third the resulting situation/state after
the occurrence of the event. With this interpretation in mind,
Rxyz reads as ‘the occurrence of event y in world x results in
the world z’ and the corresponding conditional ϕ ⊃ ψ reads
as ‘the occurrence in the current world of an event satisfying
property ϕ results in a world satisfying ψ’.
This interpretation is coherent with a number of interpre-
tations of the ternary relation proposed in substructural logic.
Keeping in mind the truth conditions for the connective ⊃ of
Definition 5, the following quote makes perfect sense:
“To be committed to A ⊃ B is to be committed to B
whenever we gain the information that A. To put it
another way, a body of information warrants A ⊃ B
if and only if whenever you update that information
with new information which warrants A, the result-
ing (perhaps new) body of information warrants B.”
(my emphasis) [Restall, 2006, p. 362]
2.3 Proof Systems
Our sequent calculus extends the Lambek calculus with
propositional connectives.
Definition 6 (Sequent calculi LCon). Let Con ⊆ {∧,→, ◦,⊃
,⊂}. The sequent calculus for LCon, denoted LCon, is the se-
quent calculus of Fig. 1 whose logical rules are restricted to
the rules for the connectives of Con. The sequent calculus for
propositional logic (where Con := {∧,→}) is denoted LPL.
A LCon–sequent X Y is provable in LCon, written
X
LCon Y , when it can be derived from the axioms and in-
ference rules of LCon in a finite number of steps. A formula
ϕ ∈ LCon is LCon–consistent when it is not the case that
ϕ
LCon . We also write
LCon X for > LCon X. 
Note that the following rules are derivable in LPL:
X , ϕ Y
X Y , ¬ϕ
¬R Γ[ϕ] U Γ[ψ] U
Γ[ϕ ∨ ψ] U
∨L.
Theorem 1 (Cut elimination [Restall, 2000]). Let Con ⊆
{∧,→, ◦,⊃,⊂}. The cut rule can be eliminated from any proof
of LCon.
Theorem 2 (Soundness and completeness [Restall, 2000]).
Let Con ⊆ {∧,→, ◦,⊃,⊂}. Then, for all LCon-sequents
X Y, it holds that X
LCon Y iff X Y.
Axioms:
p p ⊥
Structural Rules:
Weakening: Contraction:
Γ[X] U
Γ[(Y , X)] U
WL
Γ[(X , X)] U
Γ[X] U
CL
U Γ[X]
U Γ[(X , Y)]
WR
U Γ[(Y , Y)]
U Γ[Y]
CR
Permutation: Associativity:
Γ[(Y , X)] Z
Γ[(X , Y)] Z
PL
Γ[X , (Y , Z)] U
Γ[(X , Y), Z] U
BL
U Γ[(Y , X)]
U Γ[(X , Y)]
PR
U Γ[(X , (Y , Z))]
U Γ[((X , Y), Z)]
BR
Cut Rule:
X ϕ Γ[ϕ] Y
Γ[X] Y
Cut
Logical Rules:
Propositional Connectives:
X , ψ ϕ
X ψ→ ϕ
→R Y ψ Γ[ϕ] X
Γ[(ψ→ ϕ, Y)] X
→L
X ϕ Y ψ
X , Y ϕ ∧ ψ
∧R Γ[(ϕ, ψ)] U
Γ[(ϕ ∧ ψ)] U
∧L
Substructural Connectives:
X ; ψ ϕ
X ψ ⊃ ϕ
⊃R Y ψ Γ[ϕ] X
Γ[(ψ ⊃ ϕ ; Y)] X
⊃L
X ϕ Y ψ
X ; Y ϕ ◦ ψ
◦R Γ[(ϕ ; ψ)] U
Γ[(ϕ ◦ ψ)] U
◦L
ϕ ; Y ψ
Y ψ ⊂ ϕ
⊂R X ϕ Γ[ψ] Y
Γ[(X ; ψ ⊂ ϕ)] Y
⊂L
Figure 1: Our Sequent Calculus
3 Conditional Logic and Belief Revision
Default reasoning, sometimes identified with non-monotonic
reasoning and formalized by conditional logics, involves
making default assumptions and reasoning with the most typ-
ical or “normal” situations. Belief revision, on the other hand,
deals with the representation of mechanisms for revising our
beliefs. Even if the phenomena that are studied seem to be
different, we will see in Section 3.3 that default reasoning
and belief revision are in fact “two sides of the same coin”.
3.1 Conditional Logic
Default reasoning arises frequently in everyday life. It in-
volves leaping to conclusions. For example, if an agent sees
a bird, she may conclude that it flies. However, not all birds
fly: penguins and ostriches do not fly, nor do newborn birds,
dead birds, or birds made of clay. Nevertheless, birds typ-
ically fly, and by default, in everyday life, we often reason
with such abusive simplifications that are revised only after
we receive more information. This explains informally why
default reasoning is non-monotonic: adding new information
may withdraw and invalidate some of our previous inferences.
Definition 7 (Language for defaultsLDEF). The language for
defaults is defined by LDEF := {ϕ, ϕ ⊃ ψ | ϕ, ψ ∈ LPL}. 
The formula ϕ ⊃ ψ can be read in various ways, depending
on the application. For example, it can be read as “if ϕ (is the
case) then typically ψ (is the case)”, “if ϕ, then normally ψ”,
“if ϕ, then by default ψ”, and “if ϕ, then ψ is very likely”.
Numerous semantics have been proposed for default state-
ments, such as preferential structures [Kraus et al., 1990], -
semantics [Adams, 1975], the possibilistic structures [Dubois
and Prade, 1991] and κ-ranking [Spohn, 1988]. They all have
in common that they define the same set of validities axiom-
atized by the same proof system P (originally introduced by
Kraus et al. [1990]). This remarkable fact is explained by
Friedman and Halpern [2001][2003].
Definition 8 (System P). The proof system P for LDEF is
defined by the following axiom and inference rules, where all
formulas are propositional.
If
LPL
ϕ↔ ϕ′, then from ϕ ⊃ ψ infer ϕ′ ⊃ ψ (LLE)
If
LPL
ψ→ ψ′, then from ϕ ⊃ ψ infer ϕ ⊃ ψ′ (RW)
ϕ ⊃ ϕ (REF)
From ϕ ⊃ ψ1 and ϕ ⊃ ψ2 infer ϕ ⊃ ψ1 ∧ ψ2 (AND)
From ϕ1 ⊃ ψ and ϕ2 ⊃ ψ infer ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ⊃ ψ (OR)
From ϕ ⊃ ψ1 and ϕ ⊃ ψ2 infer ϕ ∧ ψ2 ⊃ ψ1. (CM)

3.2 Belief Revision
In the so-called AGM belief revision theory of Alchourro´n et
al. [1985], the beliefs of the agent are represented by a belief
set, denoted K . These propositional formulas represent the
beliefs of the agent. The revision of K with ϕ, written K ∗ ϕ,
consists of adding ϕ toK , but in order that the resulting set be
consistent, some formulas are removed fromK . Because this
can be done in various ways, 8 AGM rationality postulates
have been elicited as reasonable principles for revision.
Formally, A belief set K is a set of propositional for-
mulas of LPL such that Cn(K) = K (where Cn(K) :={
ϕ ∈ LPL | ϕ1 , . . . , ϕn LPL ϕ for some ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ K
}
). Let
K be a belief set and let ϕ ∈ LPL. As argued by Katsuno and
Mendelzon, because P is finite, a belief set K can be equiv-
alently represented by a mere propositional formula χ. This
formula is also called a belief base. Then, ϕ ∈ K if and only
if ϕ ∈ Cn(χ).
We define the expansion of K by ϕ, written K + ϕ, as fol-
lows: K + ϕ = Cn(K ∪ {ϕ}). Then, one can easily show that
ψ ∈ K + ϕ if and only if ψ ∈ Cn(χ ∧ ϕ). So, in this approach,
the expansion of the belief base χ by ϕ is the belief base χ∧ϕ,
which is possibly an inconsistent formula. Now, given a be-
lief base χ and a formula ϕ, χ ◦ϕ denotes the revision of χ by
ϕ. But in this case, χ ◦ ϕ is supposed to be consistent if ϕ is.
Given a revision operation ∗ on belief sets, one can define a
corresponding revision operation ◦ on belief bases as follows:
χ ◦ ϕ→ ψ if, and only if, ψ ∈ Cn(χ) ∗ ϕ. Then, we have that:
Lemma 3 (Katsuno and Mendelzon 1992). Let * be a revi-
sion operation on belief sets and ◦ its corresponding opera-
tion on belief bases. Then * satisfies the 8 AGM postulates if,
and only if, ◦ satisfies the postulates (R1)–(R6) below:
χ ◦ ϕ→ ϕ (R1)
if χ ∧ ϕ is LPL–consistent, then χ ◦ ϕ↔ χ ∧ ϕ (R2)
If ϕ is LPL–consistent,
then χ ◦ ϕ is also LPL–consistent (R3)
If χ↔ χ′ and ϕ↔ ϕ′,
then χ ◦ ϕ↔ χ′ ◦ ϕ′ (R4)
(χ ◦ ϕ) ∧ ϕ′ → χ ◦ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′) (R5)
If (χ ◦ ϕ) ∧ ϕ′ is LPL–consistent,
then χ ◦ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′)→ (χ ◦ ϕ) ∧ ϕ′ (R6)
3.3 “Two Sides of the Same Coin”: Ramsey Test
A well-known result, originally suggested by Ramsey [1929],
connects closely non-monotonic reasoning with belief revi-
sion. Informally, from ϕ I can non-monotonically infer ψ if,
and only if, I believe ψ after revising my belief base with
ϕ. This lead Makinson and Ga¨rdenfors [1989][1991] to show
formally that non-monotonic reasoning and belief revision
are “two sides of the same coin”.
Theorem 4 (Halpern 2003).
• Suppose that a revision operation ◦ satisfies (R1)–(R6).
Fix a belief base χ, and define a relation ⊃ on proposi-
tional formulas by taking ϕ ⊃ ψ to hold iff χ ◦ ϕ → ψ.
Then, ⊃ satisfies all the properties of P as well as Ratio-
nal Monotonicity:
if ϕ ⊃ ψ1 and not ϕ ⊃ ¬ψ2, then ϕ ∧ ψ2 ⊃ ψ1 (Rat)
Moreover, ϕ ⊃ ⊥ if, and only if, ϕ is not satisfiable.
• Conversely, suppose that ⊃ is a relation on formulas that
satisfies the properties of P and Rational Monotonicity
(Rat), and ϕ ⊃ ⊥ if, and only if, ϕ is not satisfiable. Let
K = {ψ ∈ LPL | > ⊃ ψ}. Then, K is a belief set. Let χ
be its corresponding belief base. Then, if ◦ is defined by
taking χ ◦ ϕ → ψ if, and only if, χ → (ϕ ⊃ ψ), then the
postulates (R1)–(R6) hold for χ and ◦.
X Y
(Z ; X) Y
R1
(X ; Y) U
((X , Z) ; Y) U
W′L
(W ; X) Y
(W ; (X , Z)) Y
∣∣∣ ((W ; X), Z) RM
Figure 2: Structural Rules for LP+ and LNMR
4 Sequent Calculi for Belief Revision and
Conditional Logic
We show that the main systems of common sense reasoning
can be reformulated in the proof-theoretical setting of sub-
structural logics.
4.1 Conditional Logic in Substructural Logic
Because we resort to the structural connective ; we need to
introduce and add the logical connective ◦ to the system P:
Definition 9 (Proof systems P+ and LP+ ).
• The calculus P+ for L◦,⊃ is the calculus P to which we
add the following (bidirectional) inference rule:
χ ◦ ϕ→ ψ iff χ→ ϕ ⊃ ψ (RT2)
• The sequent calculus LP+ for L⊃ is the sequent calculus
L⊃ where the structural rules are restricted to the L⊃–
sequents of depth 0, with rules R1 and W′L of Fig. 2. 
Proposition 5. The cut rule can be eliminated from any proof
of LP+ . Moreover, all the rules of LP+ are invertible.
Proof sketch. It can be adapted from [Restall, 2000, Th. 6.11]
and [Troelstra and Schwichtenberg, 2000, Prop. 3.5.4]. 
Theorem 6. Let χ, ϕ, ψ ∈ LPL. Then, the following holds:
χ
LP+
ϕ ⊃ ψ iff χ P+ ϕ ⊃ ψ
Proof. In this proof and the following, we will use the map-
pings t1 : SLConL → LCon and t2 : SLConR → LCon defined
inductively as follows:
t1(ϕ) := ϕ t2(ϕ) := ϕ
t1(X , Y) := t1(X) ∧ t1(Y) t2(X , Y) := t2(X) ∨ t2(Y)
t1(X ; Y) := t1(X) ◦ t1(Y)
We can prove by induction on the number of steps used that
X
LCon Y iff t1(X)
LCon t2(Y) (1)
The proof of Theorem 6 is by induction on the number of
inference steps used in a proof. This boils down to show that
each rule of inference and each axiom of LP+ is derivable in
P+, and, vice versa, each rule and each axiom of P+ is deriv-
able in LP+ . First, we prove that rules (LLE), (RW), (REF),
(CM), (AND) and (OR) are derivable in LP+ (in this order):
ϕ′ ϕ ψ ψ
ϕ ⊃ ψ ; ϕ′ ψ
⊃L
ϕ ⊃ ψ ϕ′ ⊃ ψ
⊃R
ϕ ϕ ψ ψ′
ϕ ⊃ ψ ; ϕ ψ′
⊃L
ϕ ⊃ ψ ϕ ⊃ ψ′
⊃R
ϕ ϕ
> ; ϕ ϕ
R1
> ϕ ⊃ ϕ
⊃R
ϕ ϕ
ϕ, ψ2 ϕ
WL
ϕ ∧ ψ2 ϕ
∧L
ψ1 ψ1
ϕ ⊃ ψ1 ; ϕ ∧ ψ2 ψ1
⊃L
ϕ ⊃ ψ1 ϕ ∧ ψ2 ⊃ ψ1
⊃R
ϕ ϕ ψ1 ψ1
ϕ ⊃ ψ1 ; ϕ ψ1
⊃L
(ϕ ⊃ ψ1 , ϕ ⊃ ψ2) ; ϕ ψ1
W′L
ϕ ϕ ψ2 ψ2
ϕ ⊃ ψ2 ; ϕ ψ2
⊃L
(ϕ ⊃ ψ1 , ϕ ⊃ ψ2) ; ϕ ψ2
W′L
(ϕ ⊃ ψ1 , ϕ ⊃ ψ2) ; ϕ ψ1 ∧ ψ2
∧R
ϕ ⊃ ψ1 , ϕ ⊃ ψ2 ϕ ⊃ ψ1 ∧ ψ2
⊃R
ϕ1 ϕ1 ψ ψ
ϕ1 ⊃ ψ ; ϕ1 ψ
⊃L
(ϕ1 ⊃ ψ, ϕ2 ⊃ ψ) ; ϕ1 ψ
W′L
ϕ2 ϕ2 ψ ψ
ϕ2 ⊃ ψ ; ϕ2 ψ
⊃L
(ϕ1 ⊃ ψ, ϕ2 ⊃ ψ) ; ϕ2 ψ
W′L
(ϕ1 ⊃ ψ, ϕ2 ⊃ ψ) ; ϕ ∨ ϕ1 ϕ
∨L
ϕ1 ⊃ ψ, ϕ2 ⊃ ψ ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ⊃ ϕ
⊃R
As for rule (RT2), because the rules of LP+ are invertible
(Proposition 5), we have that χ ; ϕ
LP+
ψ iff χ
LP+
ϕ ⊃ ψ,
by rule ⊃R. We derive (RT2) by applying Expression 1. The
derivability of modus ponens follows from the cut rule.
Now, consider the right to left direction. Cut elimination
holds for LP+ (Proposition 5) and LP+ satisfies the subformula
property. Because what we prove is of the form χ
LP+
ϕ ⊃ ψ
with χ, ϕ, ψ ∈ LPL, this entails that theL⊃–sequent will all be
of depth at most 1 (see Definition 2). So, in what follows, we
only consider L⊃–structures of depth at most 1.
The rules of LPL are all derivable in P+, because LPL ⊆ P+.
We consider the rules ⊃R,⊃L,R1 and W′L (we do not con-
sider Cut because of Proposition 5). First, we prove that ⊃R
is derivable in P+, the proof for ⊃L is similar. Assume that
X ; ψ
LP+
ϕ; we must prove that X
LP+
ψ ⊃ ϕ. That is, by
Expression 1, we must prove that from t1(X)◦ψ→ ϕ, we can
infer t1(X)→ (ψ ⊃ ϕ) in P+. This last inference follows from
(RT2) of P+. Second, we consider R1. Assume that X
LP+ Y;
we must prove that (Z ; X)
LP+ Y . That is, by Expression 1
and (RT2), we must prove that from t1(X) → t2(Y) (∗), we
can infer t1(Z) → (t1(X) ⊃ t2(Y)) (∗∗). By (RW) and (REF),
we can prove t1(X) ⊃ t2(Y) from (∗), and therefore also (∗∗).
Third, we consider W′L. Assume that (X ; Y)
LP+ U, we must
prove that (X , Z) ; Y
LP+ U. That is, by Expression 1 and
(RT2), we must prove that from t1(X)
LP+ t1(Y) ⊃ t2(U) (∗)
we can prove t1(X) ∧ t1(Z) LP+ t1(Y) ⊃ t2(U). This is true in
LPL. 
4.2 Belief Revision in Substructural Logic
Based on the rationality postulates (R1)–(R6), we can de-
fine a Hilbert-like proof system. It is not a genuine Hilbert
system because inference rules are not of the standard form:
some premises refer to the satisfiability of formulas. This
drawback is avoided in our sequent calculus reformulation by
resorting to hypersequents [Pottinger, 1983; Avron, 1996].1
Definition 10 (Proof systems AGM and LAGM).
1In all the hypersequent calculi that we define in the sequel
(based on already defined sequent calculi) we always take the in-
ternal version of the structural rules. See [Avron, 1996] for details.
X Y
(Z ; X) Y
R1
(X ; Y) Z
(X , Y) Z
Ra2
(X ; Y)
Y
R3
(X , Y) Z
(X ; Y) Z
∣∣∣ (X , Y) Rb2
(X ; (Y , Z)) U
((X ; Y), Z) U
R5
((X ; Y), Z) U
(X ; (Y , Z)) U
∣∣∣ ((X ; Y), Z) R6
Figure 3: Structural Rules for LAGM
• The Hilbert-like calculus AGM for L◦ is the Hilbert cal-
culus of propositional logic to which we add the axioms
and inference rules (R1)–(R6) of Lemma 3 (where LPL–
consistency is replaced by AGM–consistency).
• The hypersequent calculus LAGM for L◦ is the sequent
calculus L◦ to which we add the rules of Figure 3. 
Proposition 7. The cut rule can be eliminated from any proof
of LAGM. Moreover, all the rules of LAGM are invertible.
Proof sketch. Similar to the proof of Proposition 5. 
Theorem 8. Let χ, ϕ, ψ ∈ LPL. Then, the following holds:
χ ◦ ϕ LAGM ψ iff χ ◦ ϕ AGM ψ
Proof sketch. The proof follows the same methodology as
Theorem 6. For the left to right direction, we prove (R1),
(R4), (R2) (a and b) and (R5) (rule (R6) is proved similarly).
ϕ ϕ
ψ ; ϕ ϕ
R1
ψ ◦ ϕ ϕ
◦L
ψ ◦ ϕ→ ϕ
→R
ψ1 ψ2 ϕ1 ϕ2
ψ1 ; ϕ1 ψ2 ◦ ϕ2
◦R
ψ1 ◦ ϕ1 ψ2 ◦ ϕ2
◦L
ψ1 ◦ ϕ1 → ψ2 ◦ ϕ2
→R
ψ ψ ϕ ϕ
ψ ; ϕ ψ ◦ ϕ
◦R
ψ, ϕ ψ ◦ ϕ
Ra2
ψ ∧ ϕ ψ ◦ ϕ
∧L
ψ ∧ ϕ→ ψ ◦ ϕ
→R
ψ ψ ϕ ϕ
ψ, ϕ ψ ∧ ϕ
∧R
ψ ; ϕ ψ ∧ ϕ ∣∣∣ ψ, ϕ R
b
2
ψ ◦ ϕ ψ ∧ ϕ ∣∣∣ ψ, ϕ ◦L
ψ ◦ ϕ ψ ∧ ϕ ∣∣∣ ψ ∧ ϕ ∧L
ψ ◦ ϕ→ ψ ∧ ϕ ∣∣∣ ψ ∧ ϕ →R
ψ ψ
ϕ ϕ ϕ′ ϕ′
ϕ, ϕ′ ϕ ∧ ϕ′
∧R
ψ ; (ϕ, ϕ′) ψ ◦ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′)
◦R
(ψ ; ϕ) , ϕ′ ψ ◦ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′)
R5
(ψ ◦ ϕ, ϕ′ ψ ◦ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′)
◦L
(ψ ◦ ϕ) ∧ ϕ′ ψ ◦ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′)
∧L
(ψ ◦ ϕ) ∧ ϕ′ → ψ ◦ (ϕ ∧ ϕ′)
→R
As for (R3), assume that ψ◦ϕ LAGM . Then, because the logical
rules are invertible (Proposition 7), we have that ψ ; ϕ
LAGM .
So, by Rule R3, we have that ϕ
LAGM .
The right to left direction is proved similarly and relies also
on the fact that (hyper)sequents are of depth 1 because of our
cut elimination result (Proposition 7). 
4.3 The Ramsey Test in Substructural Logic
We are going to reformulate Theorem 4 in our sequent calculi,
and obtain a new formalization of the Ramsey test. Note the
similarity between Expressions (RT1), (RT2) and (RT3).
Definition 11 (Hypersequent calculus LNMR). The hyperse-
quent calculus LNMR for L⊃ is the sequent calculus LP+ to
which we add the structural rule (RM) of Fig. 2. 
Theorem 9 (Ramsey test). Let χ, ϕ, ψ ∈ LPL. Then, the fol-
lowing holds:
χ
LNMR
ϕ ⊃ ψ iff χ ◦ ϕ LAGM ψ (RT3)
Proof sketch. We define the Hilbert calculus NMR := LP+ +
(RM). Theorem 4 can be reformulated in our setting as fol-
lows: if χ, ϕ, ψ ∈ LPL, then χ NMR ϕ ⊃ ψ iff χ ◦ ϕ AGM ψ. So,
if we prove that NMR and LNMR are provably equivalent, then
we will have proved the theorem, because we already know
by Theorem 6 that AGM and LAGM are provably equivalent.
To prove that, it suffices to show that the inference rule (RM)
is derivable in LNMR and, vice versa, that the inference rule
(Rat) is derivable in NMR. It is proved without difficulty. 
5 Ga¨rdenfors’ Impossibility Result
As to the Ramsey test, a famous result [Ga¨rdenfors, 1988]
states a difficulty in introducing a connective ⊃ such that ϕ ⊃
ψ ∈ K iff ψ ∈ K ∗ ϕ. Indeed, an immediate consequence
means that if K ⊆ K ′ then K ∗ ϕ ⊆ K ′ ∗ ϕ, which is a
property essentially incompatible with the AGM postulates
for ∗. Accordingly, we retrieve Ga¨rdenfors’ result as follows:
> > ⊥
> ⊃ ⊥ ; >
⊃L
> R3
Inconsistency of L◦,⊃ extended with R3 reflects, in a way
reminiscent of Ga¨rdenfors’ proof, that conditionals capturing
defaults do not easily lend themselves to the role of premises.
6 Conclusion
Drawing intuitions from a dynamic interpretation of sub-
structural concepts in terms of updating, we have reformu-
lated conditional logic and belief revision in the substructural
framework as extensions of the Lambek calculus. We thus
retrieve some well-known results and provide new axiomati-
zations of belief revision and default reasoning.
In particular, our results show that the key to non-
monotonicity is a constrained application of the left weak-
ening rule: our inferences stay the same if our knowledge of
the initial situation is made more precise, but we may cancel
some of them if we are forced to update our knowledge in
face of new information (see rule W′L and definition of LP+ ).
The range of belief revision and default reasoning clearly
calls for further work. For example, in our setting, given our
reading of ternary relations as updates and given our truth
conditions, the connective ⊂ represents some sort of abduc-
tion (see Definition 5). This notion of abduction can now
be studied within our substructural framework in interaction
with the notions of revision, update and non-monotonicity.
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